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This paper will seek to present certain legal issues which have arisen
before the Security Council Committee Established in Pursuance of
Resolution 253 (1968) Concerning the Question of Southern
Rhodesia, 1 hereinafter referred to as the "Sanctions Committee". 2
After outlining briefly the nature and scope of the obligation to
*B. G. Ramcharan, Ph.D. (Lond.); of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-Law; Diploma in
International Law, Hague Academy of International Law; Diploma in International
Affairs (Lond.); Diploma in Air and Space Law.
This is an up-dated version of a paper read to the University of London
International Law Society, at the London School of Economics and Political
Science on November 27, 1973. It reflects solely the personal views of the author.
I. Formerly known as "The Committee Established in Pursuance of Security
Council Resolution 253 (1968)". This was changed to the present title in 1972. See
U.N. Doc. S/10852, para. 69.
2. The following sources may be consulted:
(i). Security Council Resolutions: 216 (1965), 217 (1965), 221 (1966), 232
(1966), 253 (1968), 277 (1970), 288 (1970), 314 (1972), 318 (1972), 320 (1972)
and 333 (1973).
(ii). General Assembly Resolutions: 2262 (XXII), 2379 (XXIII), 2383(XXIII),
2508 (XXIV), 2765 (XXVI), 2945 (XXVII), 2946 (XXVII), 3115 (XXVIM), 3116
(XXVIII), 3298 (XXIX).
(iii). Reports of the Sanctions Committee: Annual Reports: S/8954 - December
30, 1968, S.C.O.R., 23rd Year, Supplements for July-September 1968; S/9252
and Add. 1-12 - June 1969, S.C.O.R., 24th Year, Supplements for April-June;
S/9844 and Add. 1-3 -June 15, 1970, S.C.O.R., 25th Year, Special Supplement
No. 3; S/10229 and Add. 1 - 2, June 16, 1971, S.C.O.R., 26th Year, Special
Supplements No. 2 and 2A; S/10852 and Add. 1-2, 1972, S.C.O.R., 27th Year,
Special Supplement No. 2; S/11178/Rev. 1, January 3, 1974; S/11594 - January
9, 1975. Interim Reports: S110408, December 3, 1971; S/10580 and Add. 1,
March 29, 1972; S/10593, April 10, 1972. Special Reports: S/10632, May 9,
1972, submitted in pursuance of Resolution 314 (1972) and S/10920, April 15,
1973, submitted in pursuance of Resolution 320 (1972).
(iv). League of Nations Official Journal, Vols. 16 and 17 (1935 and 1936) and
Special Supplements Nos. 138, 145 to 150. Dispute between Ethiopia and Italy
(1936; Cmd. 5071 and Cmd. 5094.).
(v). General References: See the bibliographies cited in M. Doxey, Economic
Sanctions and International Enforcement (London: Oxford University Press, 1971)
at 149-156 and M. Eisemann, Les sanctions contre la Rhodisie (Paris: A. Pedone,
1972) at 146-152. See also Gallaher v. Customs and Excise Commissioners,
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implement sanctions, and describing the Sanctions Committee, we
shall proceed to consider the following legal issues which have
arisen before the Committee: (1) The Committee's competence to
make determinations as to compliance with, or breach of, sanctions
obligations; (2) The Committee's competence to make recommen-
dations to the Security Council for strengthening sanctions; (3) The
distinction between mandatory and non-mandatory obligations
under resolution 253 (1968); (4) The responsibility of States
regarding sanctions violations by their nationals who are abroad; (5)
The position of neutral States and non-member States; (6) The
question of who decides whether a case falls under one of the
permitted exceptions; (7) The question of pre-sanctions contracts or
licences and the plea of hardship.
If. The Nature and Scope of the Obligation to Implement Sanctions
The obligation to implement sanctions flows from three sources: (1)
the Charter of the United Nations, "acting under Chapter VI ' ' 3 of
which the Security Council adopted; (2) Resolution 253 (1968), as
well as earlier and subsequent resolutions such as 217 (1965), 221
(1966), 232 (1966) and 277 (1970);4 (3) the third source is general
international law, in particular the principle of international
responsibility, which is applicable in the event of breach of the
obligation to apply sanctions. The scope of the obligation is to be
found in resolution 253 (1968), as elaborated, interpreted and
applied in practice and in subsequent resolutions of the Security
Council and of the General Assembly. Operative paragraphs 1 - 22
of resolution 253 (1968) fall under eight categories5 whereunder the
Security Council: (1) decided, 6 (2) called upon, 7 (3) requested s (4)
[1971] A.C. 43; [1969] 2 W.L.R. 1209; [1969] 2 All E.R. 328 (H.L. (E)) and
Hodson v. The Superheater Co., [1968] 3 All E.R. 144 (Liverpool Crown Court).
3. Res. 253 (1968).
4. This paper assumes the validity of the relevant Security Council Resolutions and
therefore does not deal with the various legal questions concerning these
Resolutions which were raised by the former Government of Portugal. These
questions may be consulted in U.N. Docs. S/7271 and Corr. 1, April 27, 1966;
S[7745, August 3, 1966; S[7781, February 13, 1967; S8481, March 20, 1968;
S/8786, August 20, 1968 at Add. 5 at 18-19.
5. Infra at 549-50.
6. Paras. 3-7 and 20.
7. Paras. 8, 11, 16, 18 and22.
8. Paras 9, 15, 19 and 21.
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emphasised, 9 (5) deplored, 10 (6) urged,'1 (7) considered, 12 and (8)
condemned. 13 Ratione materiae, there are in resolution 253 (1968),
(1) acts prevented, as specified under paragraphs 3,4,5 and 8, and
(2) acts called for, as specified under paragraphs 2, 11, 16, 18 and
22. Ratione personae14: (1) Duties are laid upon (a) all States
members of the United Nations; (b) specific duties are laid upon the
United Kingdom; and (c) calls are made upon non-members of the
United Nations. 15 (2) The acts of the following persons are
specified: Governments and their nationals; 16 other persons in their
territories; 17 their vessels or aircrafts; and their airline companies. 18
Three provisions govern the obligations ratione temporis. 19 Under
paragraph 3(a) States are required to prevent the import into their
territories of all commodities and products originating in Southern
Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of the resolution.
Under paragraph 7, States are required to give effect to the
obligations in paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6, notwithstanding any
contract entered into or licence granted, before the date of resolution
253 (1968). Under paragraph 5 (a), States Members are required to
prevent the entry into their territories, save on exceptional
humanitarian grounds, of any person travelling on a Southern
Rhodesian passport, regardless of its date of issue.
There are varying standards of duty: States shall prevent2o, shall
take all possible means 21, shall take all possible further action 22 ,
and shall assist effectively 23. Under paragraph 16 the call is made
upon States Members of the United Nations, and in particular those
with primary responsibility under the Charter for the maintenance of
9. Para. 10.
10. Para. 12.
11. Paras. 13 and 14.
12. Para. 17.
13. Para. 1. This is more of an introductory paragraph and does not lay down any
specific duty or request.
14. Report S/10852, para. 106.




19. On the temporal element generally, see Gallaher v. Customs and Excise
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international peace and security. Under paragraph 21, the United
Kingdom is required to give maximum assistance to the Committee.
Qualifications and exceptions are laid down in paragraphs 3 (d), 4,
5 (a) and 7.
General principles governing the obligation to implement
sanctions, .including the principle of international responsibility,
have been emphasised in resolution 253 (1968) as well as in
subsequent resolutions of the Security Council and the General
Assembly. Paragraph 11 of resolution 253 (1968) called upon all
States Members of the United Nations to carry out .the decisions of
the Security Council contained in the resolution in accordance with
Article 25 of the United Nations Charter and reminded them that
failure or refusal by any one of them to do so would constitute a
violation of that Article. In resolution 314 (1972), which dealt with
the importation of Southern Rhodesian chrome by the United States
of America in violation of its obligations under resolution 253
(1968), the Security Council declared that
• ..any legislation passed, or act taken, by any State with a view
to permitting directly or indirectly, the importation from
Southern Rhodesia of any commodity falling within the scope of
the obligations imposed by resolution 253 (1968) . ..would
undermine sanctions and would be contrary to the obligations of
States.24
The resolution 25 specifically referred to Article 2, paragraph 6 of
the Charter. 26 The principle of international responsibility for
breach of the obligation to implement sanctions was similarly
invoked in General Assembly resolutions 2765 (XXVI) of
November 16, 1971, 2945 (XXVII) of December 7, 1972 and 3116
(XXVIII) of December 12, 1973.27
The principle of international responsibility was also present in
the practice of the League of Nations in connexion with sanctions
against Italy. Thus, at the seventh meeting of the 89th session of the
Council, in 1935, the President of the Council drew attention to the
fact that the Assembly of the League had stated in a resolution of
October 4, 1921 that "the fulfilment of their duties under Article 16
24. Para. 3. See also para. 4 of G.A. Res. 2765 (XXVI) - November 16, 1971.
25. Para. 2.
26. See also para. 8(1) of the "Draft Conclusions and Recommendations
Submitted by Poland, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Syria and the USSR", Annex III to
the Fourth Report, S/10229.
27. See para. 1 of G. A. Res. 2765 (XXVI); paras. 2, 3 and 4 of G.A. Res. 2945
(XXVII) and paras. 1, 2 and 3 of G.A. Res. 3116 (XXVIII).
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[of the Covenant] is required from the Members of the League by
the express terms of the Covenant, and they cannot neglect them
without a breach of their treaty provisions"28
III. The Sanctions Committee
The Sanctions Committee was established under paragraphs 20-23
of Security Council resolution 253 (1968). The terms of reference of
the Committee were reproduced and extended in paragraph 21 of
resolution 277 (1970) adopted by the Security Council on March 18,
1970. Furthermore, by subsequent decisions generally formulated
in the light of recommendations or proposals submitted by the
Committee, the Security Council has spelled out more clearly
certain aspects of its terms of reference. Resolutions 314 (1972),
318 (1972), 320 (1972) and 333 (1973) may be mentioned
particularly. As stated in paragraph 20 of resolution 253 (1968), the
Committee was set up as
... a committee of the Security Council to undertake the
following tasks and to report to it with its observations: (a) to
examine such reports on the implementation of the present
resolution as are submitted by the Secretary-General; (b) to seek
from any States Members of the United Nations or of the
specialized agencies such further information regarding the trade
of that State (including information regarding the commodities
and products exempted from the prohibition contained in
operative paragraph 3 (d). . .) or regarding any activities by any
nationals of that state or in its territories that may constitute an
evasion of the measures decided upon in this resolution as it may
consider necessary for the proper discharge of its duty to report to
the Security Council.
Under paragraphs 21 and 22 of the same resolution, the United
Kingdom, Member States of the United Nations or of the
specialized agencies, and the specialized agencies themselves, were
requested or called upon to supply such further information as may
be sought by the Committee in pursuance of this resolution. In
paragraph 21 of resolution 277 (1970), the Security Council decided
that the Committee, in accordance with rule 28 of the provisional
rules of procedure of the Council, shall be entrusted with the
responsibility of: examining such reports on the implementation of
the resolution as will be submitted by the Secretary-General;
seeking from Member States such further information regarding the
28. L.N.O.J. (1935) at 1226.
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effective implementation of the provisions laid down in the
resolution as it may consider necessary for the proper discharge of
its duty to report to the Security Council; studying ways and means
by which Member States could carry out more effectively the
decisions of the Security Council regarding sanctions against the
illegal regime of Southern Rhodesia and making recommendations
to the Council. Between 1968 and 1974, the Committee issued
seven annual reports 9, three interim reports on urgent cases and
two special reports requested by the Security Council concerning
ways of improving the effectiveness of sanctions.
Until 1972 the Committee consisted of representatives of ten
States. In 1972 its membership was enlarged to include all fifteen
members of the Security Council. In the same year the Council
approved certain changes intended to improve the procedure of the
Committee. 3° Prior to 1972 the Chairmanship of the Committee
rotated every month. In that year it was decided to elect the
Chairman and two Vice-Chairmen annually. The Chairman is
elected in his personal capacity, whereas delegations are designated
to provide the Vice-Chairmen. At its first meeting the Committee
decided that, in principle, meetings would be held in closed session,
subject to the right of any delegation to request further discussion of
the matter. An open meeting was held on November 9, 1973 (175th
meeting) to emphasize the Committee's continuing concern for the
full and total application of sanctions. It was also decided at the first
meeting that since it was desirable for the Committee to arrive at
unanimous decisions, recourse to voting seemed inadvisable.
However, it was stipulated that where agreement could not be
reached on a consensus the point in issue could be referred to the
Security Council, together with reports reflecting any of the issues
expressed.
IV. Legal Issues Before the Sanctions Committee
1. The Committee's Competence to Make a Determination as to
Compliance or Breach
The question of the competence of the Committee to make a
determination as to compliance or breach arose in connexion with
Case No. 75 which concerned wheat exports to Southern Rhodesia
29. See note 2 above.
30. S. C. Res. 314 (1972) and Report S/10852, paras. 66-90. See also Report
S/11594, paras. 6-13.
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permitted by Australia on what it claimed were humanitarian
grounds. In the Committee some members expressed doubts as to
the applicability to the case of paragraph 3 (d) of resolution 253
(1968) which, inter alia , specifically excludes foodstuffs from the
scope of sanctions "in special humanitarian circumstances". They
felt that it would be reasonable to speak of "special humanitarian
circumstances" in the event, for example, of a natural disaster.
Other delegations stated that since the resolution did not clearly
define what constituted a humanitarian exception, there was room
for doubt on the matter. However, they claimed "it was not the role
of the Committee to pronounce whether or not this case was
genuinely a humanitarian exception, but to provide the facts of the
case" .31
In its consideration of Part VI of its fourth report, the Committee
unsuccessfully tried to put forward to the Security Council some
agreed "observations and recommendations" as it had done in the
third report. The difficulty arose, inter alia, over the following
passage put forward in a five-power 32 draft proposal for inclusion in
Part VI, which was objected to by some delegations:
4. During its deliberations the Committee ascertained that there
were three cases of flagrant violation of and evasion from the
sanctions adopted in accordance with the Security Council
resolution 253 (1968) and 277 (1970), namely by Australian
shipments of wheat to Southern Rhodesia, by the Federal
Republic of Germany - imports of graphite, and by Switzerland
- imports of meat from Southern Rhodesia. The Committee is
concerned with the fact that these trade transactions, violating the
Security Council resolutions, are being concluded with the
knowledge of the Governments of Australia, the Federal
Republic of Germany and Switzerland, and as is evident from the
notes received from the Governments concerned these countries
intend to maintain trade relations with Southern Rhodesia.
33
The resistance of the United Kingdom representative to the
inclusion of the above passage in Part VI of the report included the
following objection: His "delegation considered that it was the
Committee's duty to report the facts to the Security Council, but not
to attempt to determine whether or not violations of sanctions had
been committed". 34 In the end, the Committee failed to agree and
31. Report S/10229, para. 57.
32. Sponsored by Poland, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Syria and the USSR.
33. See Report S/10229, Annex III.
34. Report S/10229, remarks of Mr. Jamieson (United Kingdom) at 56-57. See
also Mr. Castaldo (Italy) at 41 and 57.
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included in Part VI a few introductory paragraphs followed by the
Summary Records of the meetings at which Part VI was discussed,
and the two draft papers which were used as bases of discussion. On
the substantive issue, the Committee stated in paragraph 63 of its
report that because of the differences of opinion as to whether a
breach had occurred in the case of Australian exports of wheat to
Southern Rhodesia, "the Committee did not pass any judgment on
the question, leaving it for consideration by the Security
Council".
35
In our view the Committee does possess the competence to make
a determination of compliance or breach and to submit this as an
observation to the Security Council. The terms of reference of the
Committee clearly state that it is to "report to [the Security Council]
with its observations" on its examination of reports submitted by
the Secretary-General and on information sought for, and received
from, States or the specialized agencies. The phrase "with its
observations" is not qualified and therefore includes the compe-
tence to make observations as to whether the Committee thinks that
there has, in a particular case, been a breach or a compliance.
However, if the Committee does make a determination it can only
be an interim one and its formal status is that of an advice to the
Security Council. The power of final determination rests with the
Security Council. 36 The existence of the competence of the
Committee to make determinations is implicit in other decisions or
pronouncements in other cases. Thus, with respect to the
participation of a Southern Rhodesian team in the 1972 Olympic
Games, the Committee noted that this would be "in violation of
para. 5(b) of Security Council resolution 253 (1968)". Again, in its
report for 1969, the Committee noted that "certain States . . . are
not complying or are not yet complying fully with the measures
imposed by the Security Council." The Committee also noted that
the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia has been carrying on trade
with States in contravention of the sanctions. 37
2. The Committee's Competence to Make Recommendations for
Strengthening Sanctions
The question of the Committee's competence to make recommenda-
35. Report S/10229 (1971), para. 63.
36. See on this Mr. Strulak (Poland), Report S/10229 at 31. See also Report
S/10852, paras. 39 and 106.
37. Report S/9252, paras. 45-46.
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tions to the Security Council regarding the strengthening of
sanctions also arose in the context of its discussion of Part VI of its
fourth report. The five-Power draft for inclusion in Part VI, to
which we have already referred, 38 put forward certain recommenda-
tions which the sponsoring Powers felt that the Committee should
make to the Security Council in order to strengthen sanctions
against Southern Rhodesia. These included, inter alia, the
recommendation that the Security Council should: (1) apply all
measures provided for in article 41 of the Charter against the illegal
regime of Southern Rhodesia; (2) consider sanctions against South
Africa and Portugal in view of their refusal to implement the
relevant resolutions of the Security Council; (3) request the
Government of the United Kingdom as the administering Power to
use military force in order to secure the right of self-determination
and independence to the people of Southern Rhodesia; (4) call upon
all States to take further measures in order to stop emigration of
their citizens, as well as visits of their citizens, to Southern
Rhodesia; and (5) call upon non-governmental organisations to
comply with the sanctions imposed by resolutions 253 (1968) and
277 (1970) against Southern Rhodesia. The representative of the
United Kingdom objected to these recommendations on the ground,
as regards the first three and the fifth, that they exceeded the
Committee's terms of reference, and as regards the fourth, that in so
far as it concerned visits by private individuals to Southern
Rhodesia, it went beyond the sanctions imposed by the Security
Council.
On the point regarding the terms of reference of the Committee,
we think that the contention of the United Kingdom representative
was ill-founded. The power to submit observations to the Security
Council which, as we pointed out above, is unqualified, includes, in
our view, the power to comment on such measures which the
Committee, in the light of its experience and of the information
available to it, thinks may be necessary to strengthen those
sanctions or to make them more effective.
As a result of the debate as to the Committee's terms of reference,
some representatives on the Committee mentioned the possibility of
amending its terms of reference. However, it was recognized that
difficulties would arise in the way of doing this 39 and no proposal to
38. Supra at 546.
39. See, e.g., Mr. Castaldo (Italy), Report S/10229 at 41.
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this effect was made. On any future occasion it may be desirable to
spell out the terms of reference of a Sanctions Committee in more
detail and to include, specifically, the competence to submit
provisional determinations on questions of compliance or breach,
and the competence to submit recommendations for strengthening
sanctions, or for making them more effective.
3. The Distinction Between Mandatory and Non-Mandatory
Provisions ofResolution 253 (1968)
In its second report to the Security Council the Committee reported
that "in taking measures for the implementation of the resolution,
some states have made a distinction between mandatory and other
provisions" 40 of resolution 253 (1968). The Committee did not
comment upon this practice. However, the passage cited is
significant because it reveals the manner in which the States in
question interpreted resolution 253 (1968).
As we pointed out earlier, 4 ' resolution 253 (1968) uses language
wherein the Security Council "decided, called upon, requested,
emphasised, deplored, urged, considered and condemned." 4 2 In
our view, there is a gradation in the obligations imposed upon
States. A request, for example, is lower than a decision. A request
carries the implication that a State has a discretion whether or not to
follow it, though there is an obligation to do everything possible to
carry out that request, and if unable to do so to take measures to
minimise the effect of non-compliance. These obligations flow from
the general duty under the Charter of the United Nations to give
effect to the sanctions imposed by the Security Council under
Chapter VII.
However, the foregoing view has to be considered against the
pronouncements of the World Court in its Namibia Opinion. In
paragraph 114 of its Opinion, the Court dealt with the contention
that the relevant Security Council resolutions in that case were
couched in exhortatory rather than mandatory language and that,
therefore, they did not purport to impose any legal duty on any
State, nor to affect legally any right of any State. The Court stated
that "the language of a resolution should be carefully analysed
before a conclusion can be made as to its binding effect."
40. Report S/9252, para. 10.
41. Supra at541-42.
42. Id.
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In view of the nature of the powers under Article 25, the question
whether they have been in fact exercised is to be determined in
each case, having regard to the terms of the resolution to be
interpreted, the discussions leading to it, the Charter provisions
invoked and, in general, all circumstances that might assist in
determining the legal consequences of the resolution of the
Security Council.
43
It will be seen that the Court emphasised the language test alone
in the first part of the above passage, whereas in the second part it
placed it among other tests. Is there a distinction between the two?
Let us consider two types of cases. In Case A, a resolution is
accepted as being a mandatory one but there are, on the basis of the
language used, prima facie mandatory and non-mandatory
provisions. Would the second set of tests cited by the Court, if
satisfied, enable the conclusion to be reached that all parts of the
resolution are mandatory despite the language used? And, if such a
conclusion were to be asserted, what then would be the point of
using different language in the resolution? In Case B, the question is
one of whether or not a resolution as such is mandatory (leaving
aside the status of particular provisions) - the question of the
exercise of Article 25 as was involved in the Namibia Opinion. Here
the Court applied its second set of tests to find the resolution to be a
mandatory one under Article 25 and to find that particular
provisions were also mandatory. But let us assume that it is found
that Article 25 has been exercised in the case of a particular
resolution, does it necessarily follow that all of its provisions are
automatically mandatory, or does one still have to refer to the
language for this? In our view, where a resolution as such is a
mandatory one, the question as to whether and which parts are
mandatory and non-mandatory has to be resolved by reference to the
language of the resolution. On this reasoning we take the view that
there is gradation of obligation under resolution 253 (1968).
4. The Responsibility of States Regarding Sanctions Violations by
their Nationals Abroad - the Question of Extra-Territorial
Competence
In some cases of suspected violation of sanctions to which the
Committee drew the attention of the States concerned, the
Committee received replies stating that inasmuch as it appeared that
the reported transaction had been conducted outside the national
43. [1971]I.C.J. Rep at 16, paras. 114-115.
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territory and that the goods concerned had never entered the national
customs inspection control, no measures could be taken by
governmental authorities against the firms involved, whether or not
they were registered in that country and operating from it.
Thus, in one case, Switzerland made the following statement:
Nitrex A.G., which is mentioned in the United Kingdom
charges of 14 January 1969 was registered in the commercial
register of the city of Zurich in 1962. However, most of its
capital is in foreign hands. The transactions in which it normally
engages concern the export of nitrogenous fertilizers manufac-
tured by other enterprises associated with it. In this case, the
nitrogenous fertilizers exported to Rhodesia, were not manufac-
tured in Switzerland. In fact, they did not enter the Swiss customs
area, even in transit. This is therefore, a typical case of triangular
trade, in which the role of Nitrex A.G. is simply that of a
middleman. Since the goods in question did not pass through
Swiss customs inspection, the federal authorities have no way in
law, or even in practice, of proceeding against Nitrex A. G.
Lastly, the Permanent Observer wishes to emphasise that the
federal authorities have warned Swiss shipowners that as a
consequence of the resolutions adopted by the Security Council
on the subject of Rhodesia, they should not take on board goods
destined for or originating in that country."
In another case, Switzerland in a note verbale dated January 20,
1971 stated:
According to information which has reached the Government of
the United Kingdom [which raised the case initially], it would
appear that the sale of this chrome ore in Europe was supervised
and co-ordinated by a Swiss firm, the RIF Trading Co. Ltd. of
Zurich. The Permanent Observer of Switzerland has already had
occasion by a note of April 14, 1970 (S/9844/Add.II/Annex
VIII, page 31, para. 10 (B)) to provide the Secretary-General of
the United Nations with various data on the activities of this firm
whose business is conducted, it seems, outside Swiss territory. In
this connexion, therefore, the Federal Authorities can only repeat
that they have no legal or practical means of intervening outside
the territory of the Confederation. Under public international
law, each state is entitled to apply legal rules only in its own
territory; the Swiss authorities cannot, therefore, take steps which
would contravene positive international law. 45
In a still further case, Switzerland, in a reply dated September 8,
1972 made the following statement:
44. Report S/9252/Add. 1. Annex XI at 34, para. 462.
45. Report S/10229/Add. I at 45, Case No. 103.
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The Permanent Observer of Switzerland to the United Nations
has the honour to refer to [a note from the Secretary-General of
the United Nations] concerning a consignment of sugar suspected
to be of Southern Rhodesian origin, reportedly purchased by a
Kuwaiti firm in a transaction with UNIMER S.A. Geneva and
shipped on the Greek vessel Evangelis from Lorenco Marques to
Kuwait in January 1971.
... the transaction took place entirely outside Swiss territory.
As the Permanent Observer has already had occasion to explain
to the Secretary-General, the Swiss authorities have no legal or
practical means at their disposal of intervening in such cases.
Under international law, a State can enforce legal provisions only
in its own territory.
The Committee considered that the matter raised a question of
general importance and requested the advice of the Legal Counsel of
the United Nations. 46 The substantive part of the Legal Counsel's
opinion stated:47
The Government first comments that its authorities have no
legal or practical means of intervening outside its own territory.
This seems to me to deal only partially with the means available
to the authorities concerned to influence the companies in
question. If those companies are organized under the law of the
State concerned, have its nationality and are registered under its
law, it would appear to be open to the competent authorities to
decide whether or not to allow the companies to maintain
whatever status they enjoy under local law. It would, for
example, seem that the authorities may be in a position to require
that the companies concerned desist from engaging in the
transactions in question as a condition of the continuance of their
registration under local law.
In the second place, the Government comments that under
public international law, each State is entitled to apply legal
norms only in its own territory, and that its authorities cannot
therefore take steps which would contravene positive interna-
tional law. To the extent that this remark is to the effect that a
State may only enforce its national legislation within its own
territory, it is no doubt correct. However, it would be at variance
with both law and precedent, to assert that public international
law precludes a State from enacting laws having extraterritorial
effect and providing for enforcement within the territory of the
legislating State.
With regard to the law, reference is made to a pertinent passage in
the judgment of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the
46. Report S/10852/Add. 1, Annex H at 55, para. 8.
47. ReportS/11178, para. 138.
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case of the SS Lotus [Publications of the Permanent Court of
International Justice, Judgments, Series A-916, at pages 18 and 19]:
Now the first and foremost restriction imposed by international
law upon a State is that - failing the existence of a permissive
rule to the contrary - it may not exercise its power in any form
in the territory of another State. In this sense jurisdiction is
certainly territorial; it cannot be exercised by a State outside its
territory except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from
international custom or from a convention.
It does not, however, follow that international law prohibits a
State from exercising jurisdiction in its own territory, in respect
of any case which related to acts which have taken place abroad,
and in which it cannot rely on some permissive rule of
international law. Such a view would only be tenable if
international law contained a general prohibition to States to
extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their
courts to persons, property and acts outside their territory, and if,
as an exception to this general prohibition, it allowed States to do
so in certain specific cases. But this is certainly not the case under
international law as it stands at present. Far from laying down a
general prohibition to the effect that States may not extend the
application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to
persons, property and acts outside their territory, it leaves them in
this respect a wide measure of discretion which is only limited in
certain cases by prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every
State remains free to adopt the principles which it regards as best
and most suitable.
With regard to precedent, the United Kingdom Trading with the
Enemy Act of 1939 (2 and 3 Geo 6, c. 89), the United States
Trading with the Enemy Act (50 USCA), and more recently, the
United Kingdom-Southern Rhodesia (Petroleum) Order of 1965
(ST/1965 No. 2140), and the Southern Rhodesia (Prohibitive
Export and Import) Order of 1966 (SI/1966 No. 41) all provide
clear examples of national legislation controlling the activities of
nationals and legal persons not only at home but also abroad and
providing for enforcement at home of penalties in respect of
contraventions by them abroad without such legislation being
regarded as in conflict with public international law.
48
5. Neutral States and Non-Member States49
Prior to becoming a member of the United Nations in 1973, the
48. See, further, Report S/11594, paras. 86-89.
49. See on this, L.N.O.J., Special Supplement No. 146 at 13, 35-40, for
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Federal Republic of Germany, which held Observer status at the
United Nations, voluntarily complied with sanctions and co-
operated with the Sanctions Committee. It never raised the question
of whether it considered itself bound as a non-member of the United
Nations, to comply with sanctions obligations. 50 However, the
issue was raised by Switzerland, a non-member as well as a neutral
State. In one case, Switzerland stated in its reply that ". . . for
reasons of principle, Switzerland, a neutral State cannot submit to
the mandatory sanctions of the United Nations". However,
"independently and without recognizing any legal obligation to do
so, it has taken steps to ensure that any possibility of increasing
Rhodesian trade is excluded and that the United Nations sanctions
policy cannot be contravened." 51
6. Who Decides Whether a Case Qualifies as a Permitted
Exception?
In Case No. 133, the Swedish Government, by a letter dated June 7,
1972, informed the Committee that it had authorized the exportation
to Rhodesia of electro-medical equipment. The letter stated that the
goods had been ordered from a Swedish exporter by the University
of Rhodesia. The licence had been granted as an exception to the
general prohibition against trade with Rhodesia stipulated in the
pertinent Swedish law, which allows for exportation of medical
equipment and equipment used for educational purposes. The letter
went on to say that these exceptions were in line with the provisions
in paragraph 3 of resolution 253 (1968).
At its 102nd meeting, the Committee decided that further
information as to the nature of this shipment should be requested
from the Swedish Government in order to dispel any doubt as to the
use which the illegal regime could make of it. Accordingly, at its
request, the Secretary-General sent a note verbale to the Permanent
consideration of the position of Luxembourg and Switzerland as Neutral States. On
the position of non-member States, see the remarks of Mr. Potemkne (USSR),
L.N.O.J., Special Supplement No. 145 at 40.
50. See, however, supra at 546.
51. Report S/9252 at 6. See also, Report S/10229, paras. 51-54. Cf. Report
Sf10229 at 66-67, where a five power draft resolution called upon "the
Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and Switzerland which still
maintain illegal trade with Southern Rhodesia to comply with sanctions imposed by
the Security Council resolution and in this connexion to recall the provision of para.
6, Article 2 of the Charter." See also the Namibia Opinion, [1971] I.C.J. Rep. 16,
paras. 126-127, 133 and operative paragraph 3.
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Representative of Sweden, asking for a complete description of the
equipment in question and a detailed account of its intended use. By
a note of September 8, 1972, the Permanent Representative of
Sweden transmitted copies of documents on the basis of which his
Government had founded its conviction that the medical equipment
would be used solely for educational purposes in the new phonetics
and linguistic laboratory at the University of Rhodesia. 52 The
Committee thus emphasised that it would decide whether a case
qualified as a permitted exception. In thus acting it was of course
acting on behalf of the Security Council of which it is a subsidiary
organ. In its fourth report the Committee had already asserted the
principle that it would scrutinize the decisions of Governments.
Noting that information provided by Governments in reply to
requests for investigation often gave little or no indication of the
considerations underlying the conclusions reached, the Committee
stated that whenever an investigation is performed at its request, the
inquiring authorities should be requested to provide the Committee
with an indication of the considerations on which they based their
findings and/or copies of the documentary evidence. 53
7. Pre-Sanctions Contracts or Licences and the Plea of Hardship54
Under paragraph 7 of resolution 253 (1968), all States Members of
the United Nations are required to give effect to the decisions set out
in operative paragraphs 3,4,5, and 6 of the resolution notwithstand-
ing any contracts entered into or licence granted before the date of
the resolution. Some cases have occurred in which Governments
have permitted transactions prima facie in breach of sanctions
obligations and have submitted the plea of hardship. 55 The United
States Government, by a note dated September 17, 1970, informed
the Committee that at the time the United States implemented
52. Report S/10852, paras. 55-56.
53. See Report S/10229 at 18, para. 69. See also Mr. Zaldumbide (Ecuador), 17
L.N.O.J. (1936) at 541.
54. See on this the "Report of the Legal Sub-Committee on the Questions put to it
on October 17, 1935, by the Sub-Committee on Economic Measures: Application
of Sanctions and Private Contracts, Commercial Treaties and Treaties of Friendship
and Non-Aggression", which dealt with certain legal problems concerning
contracts in progress of execution. The performance of these contracts was
prevented under paras. 3 and 4 of "Sanctions Proposal I" - L.N.O.J., Special
Supplement No. 145 at 21-22; Special Supplement No. 150 at 6-7.
55. The plea of hardship was also raised in the League of Nations. See, e.g., Mr.
Wszelaki (Poland), L.N.O.J., Special Supplement No. 145 at 106.
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Security Council resolution 232 of December 16, 1966 (United
States Executive Order of January 9, 1967), the United States
Government announced that provisions would be made to alleviate
undue hardship for American firms which had legally commenced
transactions before United States implementation of the Security
Council resolution. According to the "hardship" provision, the
Treasury would "in general licence in those cases where payment
had been made by Americans prior to 5 January 1967" (date in the
Executive Order). The United States Government considered that in
those circumstances it was consistent with the purpose of the
sanctions programme to place the illegal regime in a less favourable
position by denying it the benefit of keeping both the funds and the
goods. In accordance with this hardship provision, a case involving
the importation of 150,000 tons of Rhodesian chrome ore was found
by the Government of the United States to qualify since the ore was
duly paid for and the funds transferred to Southern Rhodesia before
January 5, 1967; but similar requests from other firms which had
applied for import licences but did not qualify were denied.
56
In case No. 38, a reply dated January 16, 1970 from the Federal
Republic of Germany stated that it had successfully endeavoured to
implement United Nations sanctions against Southern Rhodesia and
had taken all necessary legislative measures. Consequently, trade
between the Federal Republic of Germany and Southern Rhodesia
had declined to less than ten per cent of its former volume and was
then almost exclusively confined to commodities which were not
included in the sanctions provisions or were covered by so-called
"old-contracts". All but one of these contracts had expired.
Investigations had established that the shipments of Southern
Rhodesian graphite in question were covered by the last pending
contract. The contract was concluded in 1964 and provided for
long-term imports of raw graphite from a Southern Rodesian
graphite mine. The importing company was the only one operating a
graphite mine in the Federal Republic of Germany. This company
had made increasing efforts to substitute new graphite from the
USSR, Czechoslovakia, the People's Republic of China, Madagas-
car, and Norway in place of graphite from Southern Rhodesia.
However, it was not possible to eliminate Southern Rhodesian
sources completely. The imported crystalline raw graphites had to
be similar to the graphite mined by the Federal Republic of
56. Report S/10229, para. 34.
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Germany company since they had to be reworked and refined
structurally. The company depended on the imports mentioned
above as only the Southern Rhodesian material, which was not
found in any other country, could be mixed with the Federal
Republic of Germany graphite. The Federal Government would
continue its efforts to help the importing company reduce or even
discontinue imports from Southern Rhodesia. At the request of the
Committee at its 27th meeting, the Secretary-General sent a note
verbale dated April 27, 1970 to the Government of the Federal
Republic of Germany referring to its reply dated January 16 and
requesting confirmation that the Government of the Federal
Republic intended to comply fully with the provisions of resolution
253 (1968).
57
The Committee received a further communication dated
September 16, 1970, from the Federal Republic of Germany
re-emphasising the difficulties of the German company in its efforts
to obtain elsewhere graphite of similar specifications, and stating
that although the German importers were looking for other sources,
"their negotiations have shown that it is at present not possible nor
will it be possible for the foreseeable future to obtain the necessary
quantities elsewhere.".
58
At the request of the Committee, the Secretary-General sent a
note verbale dated January 28, 1971 to the Federal Republic of
Germany, referring to its latest reply and informing it that in its next
report to the Security Council the Committee would have to indicate
that for the reasons stated, the import of graphite in question had
been permitted. In its reply dated February 24, 1971, the Federal
Republic of Germany indicated that since the immediate and total
discontinuation of imports of natural graphite from Southerrn
Rhodesia would endanger the existence of the German company
concerned and result in the closing down of the Federal Republic of
Germany's only graphite mine, the company had been continuing
its efforts to reduce graphite imports from Southern Rhodesia.
Despite increasing difficulties to obtain natural graphite from other
sources, it had to a certain degree succeeded in buying such graphite
from other countries. 59
57. Report S/9844/Add. 2, Case No. 38 at 72.
58. See further, Report S/11594, paras. 84-85.
59. Report S/10229 at 13, paras. 48-50. See also Report S/9844/Add. 2, Annex
VII at 99, Case No. 14; Report S/9252 at 6, para. 11; Report S/9844 at 28, Case
No. 41.
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Leaving aside the merits of the particular cases, the important
issue that arises here is whether the plea of hardship is entertainable
at all to permit exceptions from the obligation to implement
sanctions. In our view such a plea is entertainable60 on the ground
of equity. However, as regards the application of this principle, in
our view the decision as to whether or not there is a case of hardship
should be taken by the Sanctions Committee. Moreover, the
decision should not be taken after the event has occurred but the
permission of the Committee should be sought beforehand.
8. Other Legal Issues
The following additional legal issues, with which we shall not deal
in this paper, have arisen in the course of the Committee's work: (1)
What kinds of obligation does a State have to provide information to
the Committee? 6' (2) What weight is to be placed upon particular
pieces of evidence such as newspaper reports?62 (3) What reliance is
to be placed upon documents issued by countries such as Portugal
and South Africa which openly violated sanctions?63 (4) What is a
"special humanitarian circumstance" which can qualify as an
exception?6 4 (5) Do visits by private individuals to Southern
Rhodesia contravene sanctions? 65 (6) What is the nature and extent
of the obligations of non-governmental organizations to comply
with sanctions? 66 (7) How is the duty to ascertain the origin of
goods distributed between buyer and seller?67 (8) Does the
60. G. A. Res. 3116 (XXVIII) - December 12, 1973, makes reference to "strict
compliance" with sanctions obligations: see paras. 3 and 5(a). See also G. A. Res.
2946 (XXVII)- December 7, 1972, para. 3.
61. See on this, Report S/9252/Add. 1, Annex XI at 9-12; Report S/9844/Add. 2,
Annex VIII at 21; Report S/10229/Add. I at 14-15 and 73.
62. See on this, Report S/10229/Add. 1 at 111, Case No. 9:
The French Government refuses to form any conclusion solely on the basis of
newspaper cuttings since news items published in the press are unreliable in too
many cases to be used as the exclusive basis for judging whether certain
industrial, commercial or tourist activity is going on in Rhodesia.
63. See Report S/10852,.para. 44.
64. See Report S/10229, para. 57, and Report S/11594, paras. 82-83.
65. See Report S/10229 at 56 (Mr. Jamieson (U.K.)). Cf. Report S/10852, para.
106, quoted in note 66, infra. See also G. A. Res. 3116 (XXVI) - December 12,
1972, para. 5; Report S/11594, paras. 134-137.
66. See Report S/10852, paras. 100 and 106:
... the provisions of the relevant resolutions of the Security Council on
sanctions include the activities of individuals, private organizations and
governments.
67. See Report S/10229/Add. 1 at 99-100, where the following observation was
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participation of Southern Rhodesians in international sporting
competitions or the participation of foreign competitors in Southern
Rhodesia violate the sanctions resolutions? 68 (9) Do franchise
contracts which do not involve transfer to or from Southern
Rhodesia of goods, services or capital violate sanctions?69
V. Conclusion
The foregoing survey of legal issues which have arisen in the course
of the work of the Sanctions Committee has to be evaluated against
the outlook that exists in the Committee. As stated in its Report for
1971, representatives have expressed the view that the "Committee
[is] not called upon to deal merely with technical questions but that
its work [is] governed by Security Council resolutions which [are]
political in nature". 70 ". . . The difficulties involved [are] of a
highly political nature. The problem of Southern Rhodesia [is] one
of the major problems facing the world." 71 The Committee has on
occasions addressed itself to legal issues and, on one occasion, has
sought and obtained legal advice, but on the whole its approach is a
political rather than a legal one. There have been instances when
legal issues which have arisen have been cursorily faced but then
left hanging. Sometimes pronouncements have been made on
basically legal issues without serious prior legal examination. The
latter consideration may colour some of the legal pronouncements
which we have discussed in the earlier parts of this paper. The
question may be asked: "Should there be a stronger legal approach
in the work of the Committee?" In this connexion, it will be
recalled that the League of Nations established a legal sub-
committee to which were referred legal problems which arose in the
implementation of sanctions. Is there a case for a legal
sub-committee of the Sanctions Committee?
made by the Government of Kuwait:
.. . it is the duty of the seller to ascertain the origin of the goods and it is he
who must be held accountable for the invoice he had given which the purchaser
had accepted in good faith.
68. Report S/11594, paras. 118-122.
69. Id., paras. 179-185.
70. Report S/10229, para. 4.
71. Report S/9844, para. 58.
